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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in failing to assess prejudgment interest on the amount 
subject to the Garnishment Order. Prejudgment interest is appropriate under Utah law 
where the damages are complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the 
amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time. The garnishment amount meets each of 
these tests. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. REVIEW OF THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS A 
QUESTION OF LAW. 
Faulkner properly acknowledges that the award or denial of prejudgment interest is 
a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Nevertheless Faulkner suggests that "given 
the inherently factual nature of the determination of prejudgment interest under this 
state's Case law, as will be discussed herein, this Court would do well do [sic] change the 
standard of review accordingly." (Faulkner's Reply Brief, p. 17). However, Faulkner's 
brief is completely devoid of any review of the "inherently factual nature of the 
determination of prejudgment interest under this state's Case law." In fact, Faulkner does 
not provide any analysis of the alleged factual nature of such determinations, nor does 
Faulkner provide any discussion of the Utah cases that have addressed the award or 
denial of prejudgment interest. Faulkner offers no legal or factual support for his position 
that this Court would "do well to change the standard of review." Nor does he 
distinguish this case from the myriad of other cases, in which this Court has treated the 
question of whether to award or deny prejudgment interest, as a question of law, 
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reviewed for correctness. Corniav. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995); Klinger 
v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Court App. 1995); Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 
427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
B. WHITNEY IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Faulkner asserts that Whitney cannot establish entitlement to prejudgment interest. 
In support of this position Faulkner states that the authorities relied upon by Whitney are 
inapplicable in the instant matter. Faulkner argues that U.C.A. § 15-1-1 is inapplicable 
because "the plain language of the statute limits its application to actions involving 
contract." (Faulkner's Reply Brief, page 18). This argument is specious. 
The plain language of the statute provides that parties to a lawful contract may 
agree upon any rate of interest for the "loan or forebearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action that is the subject of their contract," but if the parties do not specify a 
different rate of interest by contract, "the legal rate for the loan or forebearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum." U.C.A. § 15-1-1. There is 
nothing in the statute that says that the legal rate of interest in contracts only, shall be 
10%. Rather, the statute specifically states that unless the parties agree differently by 
contract, the legal rate of interest for any chose in action (i.e. lawsuit) shall be 10%. This 
is further supported by the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Vali Convalescent and 
Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), where the court determined "the law in Utah . . . is to allow 'interest on overdue 
2 
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debts even where no statute provides.'" Vali at 445 (citing Boards of Education v. Salt 
Lake County Comm % 749 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Utah 1988). 
Interestingly, Faulkner cited to the Vali case in his Reply Brief as support for his 
assertion that U.C.A. § 15-1-1 does not create a statutory right to interest, but missed the 
fact that Vali also determined that there was a common law right to interest on overdue 
debts even where no statute or contract provides. Vali Convalescent and Care Inst. v. 
Div. of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Whitney has 
not argued that § 15-1-1 creates a statutory right to interest. Rather, Whitney argues that 
he has a common law right to interest, as originally determined by the "archaic Case" of 
Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co., 24 P. 586 (1890), for the overdue debt 
owing by Ms. Faulkner as the garnishee, at the statutory rate as set forth in § 15-1-11. 
The debt owed to Whitney by Ms. Faulkner was due upon her receipt of the Writ of 
Garnishment. Rather than pay the debt, Ms. Faulkner took the position that the money 
belonged to her and was not subject to garnishment for the debts of her husband. The 
court determined that the monies kept by Ms. Faulkner, in fact, belonged to Mr. Faulkner 
and were properly subject to garnishment when the Writ issued. 
Faulkner states that Whitney utterly misapprehends the effect of a garnishment. 
Faulkner states that Whitney stands in the shoes of Larry Faulkner, as against Renee 
*Under Utah law parties are entitled to interest on overdue debts even where no statute 
or contract so provides. Boards ofEduc. v Salt Lake County Comm % 749 P.2d 1264, 1267 
(Utah 1988); Boards ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Utah 1983) 
3 
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Faulkner. True. Faulkner states that Whitney does not acquire more rights than Larry 
Faulkner would have had against Renee Faulkner. True. Faulkner then states that 
because Renee Faulkner promptly disbursed the trust upon receipt of the sales proceeds, 
Faulkner would have no claim for prejudgment interest against Renee. This argument is 
illogical. What Faulkner completely overlooks in his analysis, is that Renee Faulkner 
improperly disbursed the sales proceeds to herself, not to Larry Faulkner. If, as the court 
has determined here, the sales proceeds were properly the property of Larry Faulkner, and 
Renee Faulkner had failed to pay them over to Larry Faulkner upon demand, Larry 
Faulkner absolutely would have been entitled to prejudgment interest. This is because 
under Utah law, prejudgment interest is appropriately awarded "where the damage is 
complete and the amount of loss fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures." Klinger v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Faulkner's Reply Brief is completely devoid of any analysis of the prejudgment 
interest standard in Utah. Faulkner does not argue that the damages are not complete, or 
the amount of the loss is not fixed as of a particular time because he can't. The damages 
are set at the amount of money in Renee Faulkner's possession at the time the Writ of 
Garnishment issued. Rather, Faulkner argues that awarding prejudgment interest on the 
i 
garnished amount would "unfairly and impermissibly create two judgments." Faulkner 
argues that Whitney is seeking post judgment interest on the $500,000+ fraud judgment 
4 
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and additionally, post-judgment interest on the $29,000 garnishment. This argument is a 
red herring. 
Whitney's position does not create two judgments, nor does it award double 
interest. While Whitney is moving for prejudgment interest on the garnished amount, if 
such interest is awarded, it will be paid by Renee Faulkner, and the outstanding judgment 
against Larry Faulkner will be credited for the full amount received from Mrs. Faulkner. 
Ultimately, the $29,243.64, plus the 10% interest, will be paid by Mrs. Faulkner and 
Larry Faulkner will have made 10% interest on his monies which will be credited against 
his outstanding judgment when the monies are paid over to Whitney. 
In order to demonstrate this, it is useful to look at the numbers in question. The 
outstanding judgment on the date that the Garnishment was served was $871,555.07 plus 
post judgment interest at the statutory rate. Assuming for purposes of this discussion that 
the total amount of the judgment on the day the Garnishment was served on May 10, 
2001, was $871,555.00, that judgment was earning interest at the statutory rate of 7.34% 
in 2001 and 4.28% in 2002. If the $29,243.64 had been paid when garnished (on May 
10, 20C1), it would have reduced the judgment by $29,243.64, leaving a judgment of 
$842,311.35 on May 10, 2001. This judgment would have earned interest at the rate of 
7.34% for approximately 7.5 months ($38,641.03), and interest at the rate of 4.28% for 
approximately 4.5 months ($13,519.09). This means that on May 9, 2002, assuming the 
$29,243.64 had been paid immediately upon receipt of the Writ of Garnishment one year 
5 
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earlier, the outstanding judgment owed by Larry Faulkner and Roberta Beverly would 
have been $894,471.41. 
However, what in fact happened is that the amount of the garnishment was not 
paid for one full year. Thus, the original outstanding judgment ($871,555) accrued post 
judgment interest at the rate of 7.34% for approximately 7.5 months ($39,982.58), and 
4.28% interest for approximately 4.5 months ($13,988.45). On May 9, 2002, when the 
Garnishment Order was ultimately entered, the outstanding judgment was $925,526.03 
($871,555 + $39,982.58 +$13,988.45). If the Court had properly ordered prejudgment 
interest for the one year period on the $29,243.64, Renee Faulkner would have been 
ordered to pay $32,168.00, and Larry Faulkner's Judgment would have been credited for 
that amount, leaving an outstanding judgment of $893,358.03. This Court can plainly see 
that both Mr. Faulkner and Mr. Whitney benefit from the award of pre-judgment interest, 
despite the arguments to the contrary in Faulkner's Reply Brief. Moreover, the award of 
prejudgment interest does not give Whitney interest on the garnishment and interest on 
the underlying judgment. Rather, the award of prejudgment interest gives Mr. Faulkner 
interest on the garnished amount to be credited to the underlying judgment.2 
In Utah prejudgment interest is properly awarded when "the damages are 
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of the loss is 
2If the Garnishee were an independent Garnishee, who was benefitting from holding 
the monies for over one year, and not Mr. Faulkner's wife and sole means of support, it is 
hard to imagine that Mr. Faulkner would object to the award of prejudgment interest because 
it would assist in reducing his outstanding judgment. 
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 > • *!• >se elements are met in this case and the District Coin! erred '« 
iaiiing iv d\sam pi .judgment interest. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I ni llie Ion j.iniii! n\iM>ns jin nidi'im nl inhiest is appropriate and the decision of 
I In I )i,li lei Court should be reversed and prejudgment interest should be awarded at th ~ 
rate of 10% from Ma\ 10, 2001 thiough M,iv 9, 2002. 
Respecuu.... ubmitted this _~Lzy_day • = -..^usl. 20IM. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
A r ^ ^ ? , 
Kira M. Slawson 
Attome\ s Un Appellee and Cross Appellant,, 
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